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ABSTRACT: In this paper we raise issues about discovering and modelling purpose that, in 
our view, can often be missed within operational research practice.  We suggest that, in 
problem solving, there is a danger of taking too little account of: the differences between 
espoused goals and goals-in-use; the potentially misleading nature of published goals; goals 
that express the need to avoid outcomes – ‘negative goals’; the meaning of goals in an action 
context rather than the semantics of goal statements; the dynamics and clarity implied by goal 
relationships; the potential that derives from multi-organisational settings where goals that 
express an outcome that can only be achieved collaboratively; stakeholder responses to 
expressed goals – that good solutions can be sabotaged by others;  the fact that some goals 
are contextually important but not a focus for problem solving because they are ‘not-our-
core-goals’; and the need to design ambiguity of purpose in expressing goals systems.   These 
issues are illustrated through a number of real case examples drawn from engineering, Police, 
NHS, a Research Institute, and a Utility company/Regulator setting. 
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Introduction 
 
Understanding, articulating, and modelling organizational purpose is crucial to any and every 
operational research study.  Without clarity about purpose problems cannot be understood as 
problems - problems arise because a goal(s) is believed to be under attack or not attained at a 
satisfactory level.  As Keeney has noted, “it is values [goals] that are fundamentally 
important in any decision situation” (1996: 537).  Problems do not exist without some 
implied sense of purpose, even though that sense of purpose may be implicit and often 
emotionally driven.  Explicating and clarifying purpose therefore is, a central part of problem 
structuring and an important preface, and sometimes central aspect, to any operational 
research study (and particularly one that relates to strategic problem solving and development 
– see Franco, Bryant and Hindle 2007).  However, articulating purpose is often difficult for 
managers, and when purpose is articulated it is usually complex.  To further compound 
matters, facilitating a management team towards negotiating and agreeing purpose is 
difficult, and even more so in the context of strategic problem solving or when seeking 
agreements about the strategic direction of a project, department, or organisation.   It is 
perhaps important to note here that we see little differences in the outcomes of and processes 
for agreeing purpose with respect to individuals, small groups, departments, projects, and 
organisations.  It is therefore remarkable that the process of agreeing purpose as either goals 
or an objective function is still a relatively under-developed aspect of operational research 
application – consider the majority of published papers in the so-called top OR journals such 
as Operations Research, Management Science, and well established OR teaching texts.  In the 
‘soft OR’ or problem structuring methods (PSM) field there has been more interest in the 
issues of trying to build useful decision support models when faced with a vague, imprecise, 
and messy sense of purpose (Rosenhead and Mingers 2001), but as Mingers has argued these 
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concerns have had little sway in the dominant North American operations research literature 
(Mingers 2011).  In addition, many who are concerned with decision support see problems 
from the perspective of a multiple criteria analysis have argued that the process of agreeing 
criteria is perhaps the most significant contribution an operational researcher can make (see 
Bond, Carlson and Keeney 2008).  In the broad field of multi-attribute utility analysis Phillips 
(2007) developed an approach that was deliberately called Decision Conferencing in order to 
emphasise the process and negotiation aspects of agreeing multiple criteria or multiple goals. 
Phillips (1989) argues that decision conferencing aims to develop a shared understanding of 
a sense of common purpose. 
 
In this paper we seek to reinforce the need to attend to the significance of the complexity of 
eliciting goals, the nature of goals as a complex system, and the importance of negotiating 
purpose within an organisation.  We shall present some important characteristics of goals and 
goals systems through examples drawn from our extensive action research involvement with 
over 250 organisations and a range of managers and management teams in public and private 
organisations.  These characteristics are, in summary: the significance of emergent goals; the 
role of negative goals; the systemicity of goals; the role of meta-goals; and the significance of 
‘not-our-goals’.  However these characteristics are informed by a wider set of considerations 
including the need to pay attention to determining effective means for eliciting 
goals/objectives, and assessing stakeholder responses to goals.  Each of these characteristics 
we argue is important for operational research practice and yet is not in common currency 
within our practice (although there are many authors who touch on elements of the 
characteristics).  
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Understanding the strategic direction of organisations and groups can only be derived from 
ascertaining a clarity of purpose, even if the defined purpose is necessarily chosen to be 
flexible or vague (thus allowing for adaptability).  This is particularly important when 
considering strategic goals.  As Phillips (2011) has argued,  organizations are not always 
clear about their direction, and that they “seemed to be so busy trying to do things right that 
they had not considered whether or not they were doing the right things in the first place” 
(p926).  However, clarity of purpose does not imply an agreement to so-called SMART goals 
– measurement and precision may not be important, although it is perhaps important to agree 
that these characteristics are not important.  Moreover, the last two decades have seen 
managers being bombarded with vision statements and mission statements and the 
requirement for vision and mission statements, with many of these statements being regarded 
as a joke by them and others in the organisation as they provide little in the way of guidance.  
Furthermore, in the public sector the use of these ‘business’ oriented terms sometimes causes 
resentment because they trivialise public service, and so risk staff ignoring strategy 
statements. In addition, many vision or mission statements (statements of purpose) are either 
regarded as obvious - because they are ‘motherhood’ statements that apply to all 
organisations in their sector, or unrealistic because they state aspirations that cannot possibly 
be achieved with the current resources and within a reasonable time frame.  Compounding 
this, a careful analysis of statements of purpose (mission and vision statements) – particularly 
those more detailed versions - demonstrates incoherency, emanating from unrecognised 
conflict between aspirations, opaque reasoning and incompatibility of goals statements – 
where some are aspirational and others statements of what currently exists. The process of 
‘reverse engineering’ an existing statement of purpose into a hierarchy or network of causally 
linked goals can be very revealing (see Ackermann and Eden 2011a: 152 for an example) – 
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highlighting the inadequacies of existing mission and vision statements and making the 
activity an uncomfortable (although often enlightening) process. 
 
Strategic planning, and strategic problem solving, is argued to be fundamentally related to an 
explication of organisational purpose specifying the objectives and aims of the organisation, 
and how these will be achieved (Ackermann and Eden 2011a).  Nevertheless, it is significant, 
that there is little discussion in the strategy literature of development and coherence of goals 
aside from recognising they are important (for example Johnson, Scholes and Whittington 
2008: 164-165 discusses objectives but only provide 2 paragraphs).  
 
 
In the more traditional operational research area the requirement for establishing a statement 
of purpose (as an objective function) finds clear expression in the decision making, and 
problem solving literature (perhaps most extensively and historically in Johnsen 1968). 
Indeed, the requirement for the expression of a simple single objective or ‘objective function’ 
is still frequently seen an absolute necessity for the application of most of the well-
established ‘hard-OR’ techniques.  Furthermore, the persistence of goals as a central theme in 
the operational research literature is not surprising since there is a dominant assumption that 
humans are purposeful and employ choice in attempting to realise their goals (for example, 
see the seminal work of Ackoff and Emery (1972) which attempts to carefully define the 
field, and also Checkland (1981)).   
 
However it has to be noted that a system of goals that emerges from any attempt from 
managers to articulate the goals and their impacts (thus helping to create the system) will 
always be a result of managing the constraints and political processes between organisational 
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actors (Child 1997).  Attempts to describe organisational or departmental goals as being 
unitary either in terms of reflecting a single individual or a group consensus is likely to be 
misguided, presenting an unrealistic description of goals and goal formation in organisations 
(Cyert and March 1992).  Political processes are a significant factor that often prevents 
organisational actors from establishing consensus about comprehensive long-term outcomes, 
and yet consensus is usually presumed in operational research studies (Ackoff 1981).  For 
example, Keeney’s (1988) plea to those addressing public sector problems to involve 
multiple stakeholders takes stakeholders as ‘obvious’ outsiders with clearly differing 
objectives.  Moreover, assumptions of a goal consensus with the senior management team 
and the organisation as a whole persist. As Wilson (2001: 11) notes, “all individuals within 
organised groups are acting to try to achieve some purpose (though not necessarily the same 
purpose)”.  And, for the most part, and for most organisations, a high degree of goals 
consensus is important for achieving coherent action.  
 
Additionally, even where a diversity of goals from a range of organisational perspectives is 
acknowledged and agreed, for example in developing a ‘balanced score card’ (Kaplan and 
Norton 1992), it is assumed that these goals can be integrated coherently.  A balanced score 
card  perspective has a goal hierarchy of organisational, departmental and individual goals 
forming an “integrated set of objectives...agreed upon by all senior executives” with any lack 
of agreement resolved by non-political processes of discussion and communication (Kaplan 
and Norton 1996: 76).  However some negotiation regarding the position within the 
‘network’ is almost inevitably necessary. 
 
In this paper, therefore, we raise issues about discovering, modelling, and negotiating purpose 
that, in our view, are often missed or not fully explicated within operational research practice.  
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Key points are presented at the end of each section in bold. As noted earlier these concepts 
have been derived from working with organizations using a form of action research where, 
through the use of a group support system the interventions with respect to developing 
purpose have been fully logged (see Ackermann and Eden 2011b) and the requirements of 
‘good’ Research Oriented Action Research (ROAR) have been addressed (see Eden and 
Huxham 1996; Eden and Huxham 2006).  Thus, the concepts are illustrated through a number 
of real case examples. We also argue that the problem structuring requirement of 
understanding and modelling purpose with respect to problems introduces an output from 
operational research that has implications for strategic problem solving in departments and 
organisations.  
 
What is a Goal? 
 
It is probably a good starting point to determine what do we mean by a “goal”, as opposed to 
any criteria of success, or outcome?  This is important as “there is usually no shared 
understanding of terms like mission, vision, goal, objective” (Phillips 1990: 144). We suggest 
that a goal be seen as something that is “good in its own right”, in other words it is something 
that the group or an individual wants to achieve even if other goals are not met. As Keeney 
(1988) suggested with respect to problems of public interest: when asked why an outcome is 
important, the answer may well be that “it is simply important” (p397).  Thus, the goal 
expresses a fundamental objective that represents a desire that is an end in itself with respect 
to the situation at hand (Bond et al 2008: 57-58).  Goals are aspirational, that is to say they 
are not statements about what an organisation is but rather what it wants to become.  
Although this would imply that they are timeless, in other words they can never be fully 
attained, in many problem situations they will be both aspirational and time bound –they are 
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aspirational over a period of interest. Using a real case example, in the academic world, a 
goal could be “carry out good research”; for an organisation working with social and 
economic regeneration, it might be “improve the living environment of the area”.  Other 
examples of a goal might be “build the strongest digital brand” or “grow the business through 
diversification”.  However “develop more links with local companies” is probably not a goal, 
as it is currently worded in a manner that suggests it is a means to an end rather than an end 
in its own right, although it might constitute a ‘means objective’ which contributes towards 
the attainment of fundament objectives (Bond et al 2008).  Ackoff and Emery (1972: 56-57) 
distinguish between ideals, goals, objectives, and ends but this distinction is too refined for 
use in the practical world of a manager where these distinctions are usefully fuzzy, and in our 
experiences much more located in the everyday language of the particular organisation.  
Thus, for example, good examples of what we are defining as goals are often called ‘success 
factors’, ‘objectives’, and even ‘performance indicators’.  Nevertheless, the distinctions 
offered by Ackoff and Emery can be very helpful for the OR practitioner in establishing a 
hierarchy of goals. 
 
 
Emergent Purpose 
 
In practice, action occurs in both a routine, habitual and unreflective way and also in a more 
considered, and reflective manner and that the need for problem solving derives from both 
emergent and planned actions – an illustration of ‘theories in practice’ alongside the 
‘espoused theories’ (Argyris and Schon 1974) articulated in the mission and vision. In other 
words the real purpose of organisations is often demonstrated as much through what 
managers do as it is shown in statements of purpose.  In the strategy field this is known as 
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‘emergent strategising’ (Mintzberg and Waters 1985; Eden and van der Heijden 1995), and it 
is probably the most realistic description of the delivery of strategy and of strategic problem 
solving.  Emergent strategising, and problem solving, is a combination of ‘muddling through’ 
(Eden 1987; Forester 1984; Lindblom 1959) in a manner that reflects the culture of the 
organisation – the habits of thinking and behaviours underpinned by an often unconscious 
sense of where the organization should be headed, and the context of the problem setting – 
politics, trading agreements between managers etc.  However, the same concepts apply in a 
problem solving situation.  Understanding what the real objectives of intelligent managers 
acting in the best interests of the organisation are is an important first anchor point for 
problem solving as it enables a more effective outcome.  Until we understand emergent 
purpose we cannot reflect upon it, act on it and or adjust it.  
 
At one extreme actions are seen as deliberate, methodical and sequential as in a linear, 
planned approach to delivering strategic goals (for example the linear process described by 
Chaffee 1985).  At the other extreme, organisational systems and procedures are seen to 
generate action in an automatic and unreflective way, with the benefits of those actions 
poorly articulated, understood or even considered and having little strategic coherence.  The 
‘Garbage Can Model’ of problem solving is a good example of this type of understanding 
(Cohen, March and Olsen 1972).  Similarly Starbuck (1983) argues that an action-generating 
mode is a better description of organisational behaviour than a formal problem-solving mode.   
 
Thus the implication of emergent strategizing for operational researchers is that there is a 
need to be aware of the differences between ‘theories in use’ and ‘espoused theories’ 
about purpose.  Theories in action are what actually guide managerial behaviour, and thus 
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attending too much to espoused goals is probably a serious contributor to decision making 
apparently ignoring the rational analyses of operational support.  
 
In addition, eliciting a comprehensive set of objectives is seen as difficult and “requires 
significant creativity in discussion with decision makers” (Keeney 1996: 538; see also Bond, 
Carlson and Keeney 2010). What managers see as crucial issues provides significant clues as 
to emergent goals.  Managers are rarely hesitant in expressing clear views about issues, even 
though they may be more hesitant in expressing goals.     
 
Espoused goals (published and spoken) can be ignored when deciding how to act.  The 
beliefs and aspirations that surface as managers’ act, either directly or indirectly, are the basis 
for understanding the real – emergent - goals.  These can be determined through examination 
of the issues managers choose to attend to, as by implication issues are only issues if they 
prevent some outcome from happening.  Ackermann and Eden (2011a: 161-172) identify a 
workshop based process for establishing emergent goals from issues through a process of 
laddering similar to that implied by Keeney (1988).  
 
However, confusion can result between real goals and espoused goals when senior managers, 
who believe they are acting consistently within a world of complex multiple goals, are 
perceived to be acting inconsistently by others who are more singularly focussed on their 
task, as the senior managers attend to the theories-in-use goals, whereas others are striving 
towards an espoused goal. Double messages thus can abound, particularly where a senior 
manager demands one thing from his subordinates but appears to pay little attention to it 
himself by doing the opposite through attending to a different goal. 
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One means of increasing the probability of politically feasible agreements about purpose  is 
to work in groups supported by a Group Decision Support System (GDSS) allowing for 
generation and negotiation (Eden and Ackermann 2012; Ackermann and Eden 2011b; 
Montibeller, Franco, Lord and Iglisias 2009).  The direct involvement of managers through 
the use of a GSS can ensure people being listened to and promote the significant benefits of 
‘procedural justice’ (Colquitt, Greenberg and Zapata-Phelan 2005; Kim and Mauborgne 
1995).  Thus using workshop support methods that are derived from ‘soft-OR’ methods 
can facilitate the negotiation of an agreed system of goals.  Techniques embedded in 
methods such as Strategic Option Development and Analysis (SODA), Soft Systems 
Methodology (SSM), Decision Conferencing, and Strategic Choice (see for example, 
Mingers and Rosenhead 2004; Rosenhead and Mingers 2001) can increase the likelihood of 
developing goals that will ultimately influence behaviour and importantly establish high 
degrees of validity and believability of the application of ‘hard-OR’ methods that are guided 
by such agreed goals.    
 
Thus, it is often unhelpful to take published goals too seriously but rather discover the 
goals that are driving behaviour from the issues managers are working on.  Moreover, 
managers are driving out a future that should not necessarily be framed by the past.  
Inevitably managers will have been influenced by existing published goals, but we (and they) 
might wish this to have the least possible impact upon considering appropriate goals the 
future. 
 
Emergent Purpose: the role of ‘negative goals’ 
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It can be argued that managers act to avoid negative outcomes, with no clear conception of a 
positive future organisational state.  As Morgan (1983) suggests, from a cybernetic 
perspective,  an organisation often arrives at its present state through the elimination of 
alternative, less desirable states rather than the purposive design of a preferred state.  Many 
priority issues are resolved in order to avoid disastrous outcomes (Mintzberg 1973; 
Mintzberg 1975) rather than to achieve particular goals.  These disastrous outcomes can be 
viewed as ‘negative-goals’ - that is ‘aspirations to avoid’.  ‘Negative-goals’ tend to give as 
strong a clue about the emergent strategic direction of the organisation as do positive goals. 
For negative goals the contrasting circumstance would not be expressed as a goal, but the 
outcome (disaster) itself is of the same status as a goal and must be avoided. For example 
when working in a publishing company, the marketing department might find itself in the 
position of having too many demands on its staff resulting in stress and burn out. When 
thinking of their own marketing goals, ‘not stress and burnout’ would not have emerged 
however its emergence as a negative goal does help frame purpose through recognising the 
resource considerations of goals.  Alternatively the negative goal may be incorporated into 
the goals system by negating it.  For example, a governmental organisation such as a school 
may identify a major issue related to drug taking; this may be seen as the consequences of a 
range of issues outside of the school.  While the management team would never have adopted 
a goal related to drug taking in the normal course of establishing purpose, now that they have 
to deal with the negative-goal (disaster) of drugs they may revise their own goals system to 
include the goal of "keep drug taking under control". 
 
One way of understanding how significant negative-goals can be is to consider them at the 
personal level.  We gain a clearer sense of ourselves, by reflecting upon what we seek to 
avoid and what causes a feeling of great anxiety as we anticipate the future – understanding 
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the thinking which produces sleepless nights.  We focus on issues which are only issues 
because they ‘attack’ goals or cause negative goals (thus returning to the above consideration 
regarding goals in action rather than espoused goals).  Apparent patterns of action are often 
attempts to work within a set of organisational constraints which are, in effect, goals albeit 
sometimes negative goals. An example here might be the goal/constraint of ‘keep costs low’. 
In addition, multiple organisational constraints interact to constrain managerial latitude for 
action and hence influence the construction of goals (Simon 1964).  
 
If managers were to be asked what their goals were then they would be unlikely to talk about 
the way in which their behaviour was framed by the avoidance of negative outcomes or 
managing within constraints and instead focus on the positive outcomes.  It is somehow only 
legitimate to talk of positive goals with high possibility of ending up with a very 
finite/limited subset of goals.  And yet, this focus on avoiding disastrous outcomes is a 
perfectly legitimate activity and one that reflects the reality of organizational life.  The 
perceived requirement to only talk about positive goals is reinforced when considering some 
of the well-known approaches to dealing with messy organisational problems.  These 
approaches start with an assumption that managers know what their objectives are, or that 
problems are to be formulated against an idealised conception of where the organisation 
wants to be (for example, Ackoff 1974; Checkland 1981; Kepner and Tregoe 1965; 
Ozbekhan 1974).  Thus, managers are used to the idea that unless they know what their goals 
are and can clearly articulate them then they are poor managers.  This requirement reinforces 
a view that goals should not only be known but also should be positive.  
 
Surfacing negative goals is therefore important and participants must be encouraged to 
express the potential for disaster as well as positive outcomes.  Sometimes these disasters can 
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be rephrased as positive outcomes but often the positive phrasing derives from simply putting 
the word “avoid” or “reduce” in front of the negative goal recognising the reality of the 
situation.  Furthermore, given what we have said above about organizational constraints, 
beware of too quickly rephrasing negative goals into positive goals that are unrealistic – there 
is a significant difference between a goal of “avoid making a loss” and “make a profit”!    
 
Thus, in understanding purpose we i) do not presume that we know what goals drive the 
behaviour of the organisation, and it can be dangerous to presume that they are those 
published, and ii) accept that goals can be negative.  
 
A Goals System 
 
It is normally the case that any complex problem situation, or ‘mess’ (Ackoff 1981), or 
‘problematique’ (Ozbekhan 1974), involves paying attention to more than one goal.  This is 
the foundation of multiple criteria decision analysis (Figuira, Greco and Ehrgott 2005:6).  
These goals are inter-connected rather than being independent of one another – each goal is 
supported by others, and in turn each goal supports other goals (see Hampden-Turner (1990) 
for an interesting exposition on goal networks).  The goals make up a system of goals.  This 
also means that the meaning of any one goal is defined by the particular words used to 
describe it as well as its context – important additional meaning is derived from other goals 
that support it, and by the goals that are supported by it.  This is important because often two 
groups/organisations can state the same goal (using nearly identical language) but its meaning 
can be very different in each case depending on what it is aspiring to support and what 
supports it. 
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ABOUT HERE - Figure 1: an example of two goals systems focusing on an apparently 
identical goal (high quality engineering) 
 
In figure 1, the goal concerning high quality engineering is shared by both organizations. 
However when considering the goals linking both in and out of high quality engineering, it is 
clear that there are very different interpretations of high quality engineering with very 
different expected goal outcomes. These fragments of a goals system additionally illustrate 
both broad generic goals (those at the top of the chain) as well as more detailed specific 
differentiated goals (further down the chains of argument).  The picture reveals goals that are 
not dissimilar to Keeney’s fundamental objectives and means objectives structure, developed 
through a process of laddering up and down and teasing out nuance – and reflects the view 
that “it is natural to structure a set of objectives, or equivalently value criteria, into a 
hierarchy” (Keeney 1996: 540).  
 
Problem solving and operational research is typically about analysis to determine the nature 
of the change that is required to shift the situation to one more desired, and change is about 
causality – about determining the appropriate means-ends relationships that will generate the 
desired change. Thus, by stating which actions contribute towards the realisation of particular 
goals – the means-ends structure - this clarifies what it is that actions and sub-ordinate goals 
are expected to achieve.  Coherency thus can be achieved as the goals support one another, 
rather than being isolated and potentially contradictory (as is often the case, for example, 
when reviewing organizational, departmental, and project mission and vision statements). It 
also ensures that the actions can be focused appropriately; that is, rather than simply agreeing 
what needs to be done, it is more important to agree what is to be achieved by the actions. 
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There is a danger that the use of mathematical models to help decide on courses of action, 
where there is clarity of goals and means-ends, will lead to agreement about action but, 
because of model opacity, managers will forget what the means-ends structure says about the 
often complex ramifications that they are expected to follow from the action. Using a ‘causal 
mapping’ approach is “particularly useful (tool), as the means-end structure permits the 
analyst to ladder towards decision makers values and find their fundamental and strategic 
objectives” (Montibeller and Franco 2011: 858).  For example, in a case reported by Keeney 
(1996), BC Hydro had a published mission statement which comprised a number of very 
broad goals, however on reflection it was established that these were too overarching to 
provide sufficient guidance for decision making and more detailed and business oriented 
goals needed to be developed to augment these highly generic goals. 
 
However, representing causality does complicate statements of purpose as goals, particularly 
those more detailed distinctive goals, may have multiple consequences (links out) and thus 
form a complex network.  This is in contrast to structures often produced when using basic 
Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) where the ‘goals system’ (criteria) will be 
expressed as an ordered and tidy tree structure.  The use of the basic MCDA technique 
depends upon having a tidy tree structure where each goal has a series of sub-goals and those 
sub-goals service only one higher-order goal. Thus “a value tree decomposes variables to 
successively greater detail through levels of a hierarchy; strict preference-independence 
conditions must be satisfied, and a fully compensatory preference structure is implied” 
(Montibeller, Belton, Ackermann and Ensslin 2008: 575).  In practice, our investigation into 
real organizational goal systems reveals a more complicated structure where each goal 
frequently serves more than one super-ordinate goal (multiple consequences) rather than a 
single one.  Keeney (1988: 398-399) solves this problem by generating a hierarchy which is 
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made up of clusters of goals and delivered as a list of categories.  This tension can be seen 
when reviewing an organizational situation as discussed in Belton, Ackermann and Shepherd 
(1997) where purpose was determined through exploring issues and negotiating agreement 
resulting in a goals system which then had to be converted to a tree (with the loss of richness) 
in order to assess the alternatives.  In some respects this view of tidiness reflects the issues 
raised by organisation theorists when they argue that unravelling complementarities, 
portfolios, and synergies are significant determinants of organisational success (Whittington, 
Pettigrew, Peck, Fenton and Conyon 1999).  
 
Often a network of goals is complicated because everything apparently leads to everything 
else – which it sometimes does!  However, it represents the ‘messiness’ of the desired 
purpose – which in itself is a negotiation of viewpoints and recognition of external pressures. 
In addition, the structure reveals what is important, namely those statements that are the key 
drivers (those with many consequences) and those that will be primarily used to deliver the 
future – a focus on high leverage, pragmatism, least expensive, quickest to attain, and so on.   
 
Thus, we argue that an organizational goals system is likely to be far less ordered than a 
simple hierarchy, and that to express it as a tidy structure is to miss the real issues of 
messiness in complex problem solving.  When seeking to understand the goals system with 
respect to a problem, it is important to be aware of the risks of forcing a goals system into 
a too tidy hierarchical tree structure and appreciate that the meaning of each goal 
depends on its context – what supports it and what it supports.  The meaning of any one 
goal is defined not so much by the particular words but its context of supporting goals and 
supported goals. 
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ABOUT HERE - Figure 2: An example of a section of a goals system showing that the 
structure reveals the leverage to be gained from ‘stronger community partnership working’ 
(bottom right in the figure, with 5 impacts) and centrality of the ‘community having 
confidence in the police’.  
 
 
A Goals System: Cyclical goals 
 
Sometimes the impact of one goal upon another can generate self-sustaining goal oriented 
outcomes - feedback cycles. Recognising that some goals can feed off one another derives 
from considering goals as a system.  However, often it is simpler for a problem solving group 
to recognise the feedback aspect of their goals but structure them as a hierarchy as illustrated 
below in figure 3.  
 
ABOUT HERE: Figure 3: a section of a goals system illustrating a feedback loop within the 
goals system of a Research Institute. 
 
Figure 3, shows an example of a client group managing a Research Institute who identified a 
feedback loop implying that ‘enhance our profile’ may lead to ‘enhance reputation in the 
World’ which will lead to ‘increase income from non-public funded research’ which can lead 
to ‘deliver a more flexible and reliable source of income’, which they reasonably believed 
would ‘enhance our profile’.  While the group believed that the feedback was legitimate, for 
the purposes of expressing their goals they felt that it was more important to identify a 
hierarchy of importance, and so opted for working to ‘deliver a more flexible and reliable 
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source of income’ as the most hierarchical goal.  In this case they believed they could identify 
better solutions through a focus on the hierarchy of goals rather than the feedback 
relationship, and that whilst the dynamic of feedback was important it was at such a high 
level of abstraction that was unimportant to the consideration of options.  In contrast, in our 
work with the management team of a police force a similar reputational feedback loop had 
significant operational implications, and the sustenance of the loop was highly dependent on 
solutions to budgetary issues.  In this case the significance of feedback that encompassed 
goals resulted in the requirement to build a System Dynamics simulation model (Howick and 
Eden 2011). 
 
Whilst the identification of feedback loops can give important insights into a sustainable 
business model, when finding a generic feedback loop – for example, those often displayed in 
for-profit strategy statements where increase in profit leads to increases investment in 
strategic programmes which in turn delivers more profit – less value is accrued.  This type of 
generic business feedback loop is rarely worth expressing: success breeds success.  In 
operational research terms this attendance to dynamic behaviour not only touches on 
modelling approaches such as system dynamics but more fundamentally does not become 
constrained to simple tree structure. Problem solving recognises the value added of 
attending to dynamic behaviour in a goals system when it is appropriate to do so. 
 
The Role of ‘Meta-goals’ 
 
In some instances problem solving is not undertaken for a single organisation, but rather for a 
multi-organisational venture.  A multi-organisation can sometimes be a designed 
collaboration between departments and operating companies in the same overall organisation. 
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It may also at least initially be created from developing a goals system that not only the 
organizational management team aspire towards but which key external stakeholders also 
support (particularly in the case of public sector bodies and government regulation and 
funding agencies). The problem solving work thus relates to seeking better ways of gaining 
the advantage of two or more ‘organisations’ working together.  It is in these circumstances 
that exploring and agreeing meta-goals can have a significant pay-off. 
 
Meta-goals are goals that no one part of the organisation could attain on their own, or in the 
case of alliances or collaboration, they could not be attained fully without all (or at least a 
number) of the organisations working together.  The notion of a meta-goal is important for 
collaborations and is the expression of the potential for ‘collaborative advantage’ (Eden and 
Huxham 2001;  Huxham and Vangen 1996;  Vangen and Huxham C. 2011;  and also 
Ackermann, Franco, Gallupe and Parent 2005;  Bryson, Crosby and Stone 2006).  Only when 
meta-goals can be identified is it possible to conceive of the means for supplying a potential 
‘collaborative advantage’ for the different ‘organisations’.   
 
Meta-goals are particularly salient for public and not-for-profit organisations and most 
particularly among multi-organisation collaborations (Ackermann, Franco, Gallupe and 
Parent 2005;  Ackermann and Eden 2010;  Eden and Ackermann 2012).  Thus the goal is a 
goal of the collaborative - addressing a public problem that requires one's own actions and 
those of others.  The meta-goal is deliberately created by the collaboration.   
 
For example, when working in the health services, the goals of one organization might be to 
provide effective care pathways which can only be realised if the same goal (albeit with 
different actions) is aspired towards by other related and supporting agencies.  An example of 
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this is providing effective quality of care for dementia patients where the goals of social 
workers and the UK National Health Services overlap and where working together ensures a 
better achievement of the goals (see figure 4). 
 
 
ABOUT HERE - Figure 4: An Example of a meta-goals system 
 
Figure 4 shows an example of the goals system developed through a multi-organisational 
workshop. It shows good examples of the creation of a goals system that was seen by the 
group to be solely meta-goals; in other words nothing could be achieved without their 
working together! Indeed it is significant to note how significant the goals relating to cultural 
differences and shared responsibility were for this multi-organisational group – perhaps the 
group should have regarded these two drivers as short term strategies rather than long term 
non-optional goals? 
 
When working in problem solving settings that involve multi-organisations it is 
important to acknowledge and consider as important the role of meta-goals, where these 
goals are non-optional goals for both organizations and which cannot be achieved without the 
collaboration.  The identification of the potential for ‘collaborative advantage’ and/or, in 
addition, represents goals that can be attained much more extensively through working 
collaboratively.    
 
‘Not-our-core goals’ 
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Identifying the boundary between the non-optional goals of an organisation and those of 
other organisations and stakeholders, will define what can usefully be called ‘not-our-core 
goals’.  This type of overarching goal can be viewed as a ‘not-our-goal’ because whilst the 
organisation is prepared to acknowledge that it might contribute towards its achievement, it 
would not be prepared to be help accountable for delivering it. Furthermore, it is not 
necessarily explicitly agreed across several organisations.   This type of goal is predominantly 
particular to not-for-profit and public sector organisations.  
 
Sometimes this means that ‘not-our-goals’ are goals that “we are not prepared to be 
accountable for the achievement of but must support”.  For example, for a local economic 
development organization, a goal might be ‘to ensure a safe community’ – something that is 
important for the redevelopment of the area but something that the organization, on its own, 
could not achieve and will not be held accountable for.  These ‘not-our-goals’ reflect a wider 
remit and have significant power over the future, consequently they act as constraints to the 
actions of the organization.  In corporations they are sometimes referred to as non-market 
goals and strategies (Lawton, McGuire and Rajwani 2013) and often result from a focus on 
the strategic management of stakeholders (Ackermann and Eden 2011c).  Thus, instead of 
being at the bottom of a strategy map as constraints, they represent outcomes “we must drive 
towards, because they are the goals of stakeholders in my future (and not necessarily 
supportive stakeholders)”.   
 
As noted above, this category of goal is particularly useful in working out purpose for a not-
for-profit or public sector organisation.  For example, the Chief Executive of a Prison Service 
saw it as very important to acknowledge the goal of “keeping prisoners safely housed” but 
would only acknowledge that he contributed to “reducing recidivism (re-offending)” – 
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reducing recidivism was a ‘not-our-goal’ for his organisation, but one worth expressing at a 
hierarchically super-ordinate level because it signalled that he expected his organisation to 
make a contribution.  Thus the Prison Service was pleased to collaborate with other social 
support agencies in helping reduce recidivism but was not prepared to be held solely 
accountable for this goal.  However, at the same time the Chief Executive was particularly 
keen to ensure that all his staff were wholly committed to seeking to reduce recidivism.    
Achieving their own goals - and the larger public goal of reducing recidivism - involves 
supporting the actions of others in the collaboration, where the ‘not-our-goal’ relates to the 
larger public issue.  A ‘not-our-goal’ therefore may arise when there are significant positive 
externalities.  It is however possible that this circumstance amounts to implicit collaboration, 
because it is appreciated only by one organisation.  In this case the goals of the organisation 
are seen as paramount and the larger public goal is a by-product. 
 
The notion of ‘not-our-goals’ draws attention to the dangers of paying too much attention 
to grand goals that are not really the non-optional goals of the specific organisation, or 
part of the organisation – those that need to be addressed for effective problem-solving . 
In addition the concept reminds a group of the need to consider the power of stakeholders 
who can sabotage and support their own goals, and so goals must be adopted that 
manage these stakeholders, even the goals are ‘not-our-core-goals’. 
 
The Quantification of Goals 
 
Some management, and particularly project management, books argue that unless goals are 
SMART (Doran 1981)  – Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic, and Timely – then they 
serve no useful purpose and will not drive behaviour.  In some instances this is a reasonable 
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stance to take, however, in other situations opportunism is a perfectly rational response to 
uncertain and rapidly changing (“high velocity”) environments (Eisenhardt 1989).  
Opportunism and flexibility within a framework of purpose is thus appropriate (as noted by 
the discussion on emergent strategizing).  The rate of change of events and the 
unpredictability of opportunities and problems means that it is sensible for goals and 
processes not to be elaborately developed with specific targets - it may be much better to 
have a plan that is loose and easily adapted (Eden and Ackermann 1998: 9). Thus, in 
articulating purpose it is not always necessary that goals be SMART goals. 
 
However, in operational research there is a tendency that we want to quantify everything.  
The use of utility theory in evaluating options, as presented through the use of, for example, 
Decision Conferencing (Phillips 1989;  Phillips and Bana e Costa 2007;  McCartt and 
Rohrbaugh 1995) depends upon at least establishing the relative importance of goals.  So too 
do criteria trees – used in Multi Criteria Decision Making – with weights being allocated to 
each (Belton and Stewart 2002).  Influence diagrams may see the stocks being counted and 
the flows measured in terms of rates. In addition to the dangers of locking in behaviour, it is 
also worth noting that there is the risk of some double counting in this acronym – specific (S) 
and measurable (M) are similar, and attainable (A) and realistic (R) could be considered the 
same. 
 
Organizational goals in practice struggle with this need to attend to SMART requirements, as 
they typically are not specific enough and not measurable quantitatively; although it is 
recognised that they should be attainable, realistic, and timely.  To ensure for contingencies 
and reality, it will be important that they are appropriately fuzzy but nevertheless provide a 
distinctive framework for action – a fine line to walk. It is important that the goals are 
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specific enough – that is, the wording needs to ensure that managers cannot fudge every 
decision they make by being able to claim that their chosen strategies fit the purpose, 
whatever they are!  There is a risk that, in the early stages of developing a goals system, the 
wording of goal statements will tend to be sloppy as managers work to negotiate agreement – 
but these as agreement emerges can be tightened accordingly.   
 
It must also be noted that specificity can be seen as the same thing as measurable, and 
measurable can imply both quantitative and qualitative measures.  Indeed, it is rare for 
quantitative measures to be the only appropriate type of performance indicators that might be 
embedded in a goal statement. The age old saying that “what gets measured gets done” 
applies (Kerr 1995), and often too much quantitative measurement pushes the delivery of 
goals in an unintended direction.  Kerr’s discussion of the folly of rewarding A whilst hoping 
for B illustrates this, as does the sentiment put more admirably by Albert Einstein: 
“Everything that can be counted does not necessarily count; everything that counts cannot 
necessarily be counted”.  So, in developing and agreeing goals we need to balance the needs 
for SMART-ness with the need for promoting behaviours in a particular direction. 
 
This is not to imply that developing key performance indicators (KPI’s), as measures, with 
respect to each goal is not helpful.  In most cases KPI’s help by giving managers a clue to 
how they will know when they are making progress towards a goal and also, act as a dialectic 
to ensure understanding of the goals and its associated actions.  However such KPI’s need not 
always be measured quantitatively, adding qualitative measures may avoid losing the essence 
of a goal.  
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Thus, sometimes designed ambiguity of purpose, in particular in expressing goals systems, 
can be important.  Goals may usefully, on occasion, provide no more than a rough 
framework for problem solving, and a part of the contribution from operational research is 
that of facilitating the revision of a goals system.  A balanced set of measures are also 
important. 
   
Illustrating the Nature and Characteristics of a Goals System… 
 
The example in figure 5, shows the goals system created jointly between a Utility Co and 
Regulator.  It illustrates many of the characteristics and issues related to developing and 
agreeing a goals system including the appearance of meta-goals and ‘not-our-goals’.  The 
goals system was developed by initially exploring the issues and risks that were regarded as 
high priority and then seeking to understand why the management team had made that 
judgment. The management team were particularly interested in the significance of the goals 
system – the pattern of goals – as this system revealed further insights in terms of the 
significance of the goals. 
 
 
ABOUT HERE - Figure 5: The final agreed goals system for the Utility Co/Regulator project 
(boxed goals are meta-goals, and goals in ovals are ‘not-our-goals’, italicised non-boxed are 
Utility Co core goals, and non-italicised Regulator core goals). The structure also shows an 
untidy network which is not tree-like. 
 
So What? 
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At the end of each section of this paper we have attempted to identify why the arguments 
presented matter for successful operational research practice and highlighted these. Overall 
we are suggesting that we should pay more attention to some of the subtle aspects of an 
‘objective function’ recognising some of its limitations.  It is, of course, no use to devise 
solutions to the wrong problem depending on which stakeholder is asked different objectives 
will apply (Ackermann and Eden 2011c; Ackoff 1979; DeTombe 2002; Mitchell 1993; 
Mitroff and Featheringham 1974) as the problem is most significantly defined by a statement 
of purpose – a goals system.  Gaining clarity with regards to the different goals/objectives 
being focused upon when undertaking the modelling activity is going to be important if a 
successful outcome is to be realised against these goals.  
 
In addition, paying attention to the different managerial objectives and their associated 
priorities and meaning decreases the probability of false agreements resulting – where a client 
group agree solutions but don’t act on them.  All too often the precise rationality of 
operational research modelling makes it difficult for clients to argue against the conclusions 
in public, rather they agree with them but have no intention of implementing the supposed 
solutions.  In these instances we have often missed crucial aspects of the problem situation 
because of the goal’s illegitimacy, fuzziness or over-precision, or simply because the 
technique used to identify them was too narrow-minded. 
 
Furthermore, we have argued that paying attention to the implications of an emergent system 
is important, because it provides coherence.  Understanding how the different goals support, 
or not, one another helps develop a way forward that has a greater chance of success.  
 
 28 
Recognising that goals don’t have to belong to only an individual, department or 
organization, but rather can be more encompassing of multi-organisational possibilities 
ensures that in these times of austerity and economic turbulence more effective working can 
be achieved. 
 
In summary, our headline warnings (in bold in the text) are: 
 
 be aware of the differences between ‘theories in use’ and ‘espoused theories’ about 
purpose 
 recognise it is often unhelpful to take published goals too seriously but rather discover 
the goals that are driving behaviour from the issues managers are working on 
 the use of workshop support methods that are derived from  ‘soft-OR’ methods can 
facilitate the negotiation of an agreed system of goals 
 do not presume that we know what goals drive the behaviour of the organisation, and 
it can be dangerous to presume that they are those published 
 accept that goals can be negative (a focus on avoiding outcomes) 
 be aware of the risks of forcing a goals system into a too tidy hierarchical tree 
structure 
 appreciate that the meaning of each goal depends on its context – what supports it and 
what it supports 
 problem solving recognises the value added of attending to dynamic behaviour in a 
goals system when it is appropriate to do so 
 when working in problem solving settings that involve multi-organisations it is 
important to acknowledge and consider as important the role of meta-goals 
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 attend to the dangers of paying too much attention to grand goals that are not really 
the non-optional goals of the specific organisation – those that need to be addressed 
for effective problem-solving 
 consider the power of stakeholders who can sabotage and support goals, and so goals 
might be adopted that manage these stakeholders, even the goals are ‘not-our-core-
goals’ 
 appreciate that designed ambiguity of purpose may often be appropriate - a rough 
framework for problem solving may be more appropriate for problem solving than 
precisely expressed, measurable, goals 
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build market share
attract new
customers retain new customers
gain customer
satisfaction
develop effective
career paths
ensure high quality
engineering
engender staff with
a pride in their
work
attract excellent
engineering staff
build high quality
products
ensure high quality
engineering
ensure good working
practices rather
than continuously
flitting from
project to project
avoid mistakes
keep costs low
 
Figure 1: an example of two different parts of an organisation expressing the same apparent goal  - high quality engineering – with very different 
meanings in terms of actions and outcomes) 
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Figure 2: An example of a section of a goals system from a Police Force showing that the structure reveals the leverage to be gained from 
‘stronger community partnership working’ (bottom right in the figure, with 5 impacts), and centrality of the ‘community having confidence in 
the police’. 
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enhance our profile
enhance reputation
in the World
increase income from
non-public funded
research
deliver a more
flexible and
reliable source of
income
improve the quality
of our
internationally
based research
increase knowledge
exchange between
research centres
 
Figure 3: A section of a goals system illustrating a self-sustaining feedback loop within the goals system of a Research Institute. 
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availability of good
and varied dementia
care in the Borders
overcome culture
differences across
different dementia
providers
increase
AVAILABILITY of
specialist dementia
care
increase quality of
dementia care in the
private sector
meet increased
User/Carer
expectations
respond and manage
the needs and impact
of patients with
dementia in general
& community
hospitals
increase feeling of
shared
responsibility for
range of services
between SWD and NHS
provide a more
HOLISTIC & PERSON
CENTRED approach to
meeting integrated
care needs
deliver a range of
care options to a
dispersed population
in a rural area
STOP inadequate
choice of a variety
of good quality long
term care homes in
all areas
increase of
independence and
well-being of those
with dementia
improve QUALITY of
care across all care
providers
STOP threshold of
risk continuing to
go up
STOP making it more
difficult for
families to get
access to a
diagnosis of
dementia
reduce waiting times
for community care
assessment
 
 
Figure 4: An Example of a meta-goals system developed by a multi-organisational team expected to address the strategic problem of continually 
increasing dementia in a health district 
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Figure 5: The final agreed goals system for a Utility Co/Regulator project (boxed goals are meta-goals, and goals in ovals are ‘not-our-goals’, 
italicised non-boxed are Utility Co core goals, and non-italicised Regulator core goals). Both organisations saw a potential for dysfunctional 
working and set out to solve the problem of effective joint working.  The structure also shows an untidy network. (The intervention continued 
with risk analysis within the context of the agreed goals system). 
 
